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CHAPTER 8
The Future of the Cadillac Tax
KATHRYN L. MOORE
Kathryn L. Moore: Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky College of Law.
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§ 8.01 INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act1 includes a 40 percent excise tax on high-cost employer-
sponsored health care coverage.2 Often referred to as the “Cadillac tax,”3 this excise
tax is one of the most controversial elements of the Affordable Care Act.
Currently scheduled to go into effect in 2020,4 the Cadillac tax poses serious
challenges and uncertainty for employers. On the one hand, recent estimates suggest
that the Cadillac tax may hit as many as 20 percent of employers with health care plans
in 2020.5 On the other hand, there is a serious question as to whether the tax will be
repealed before its effective date; it is politically unpopular and faces bipartisan
opposition.6
This Article assesses the Cadillac tax and its future. It begins by describing the
Cadillac tax.7 It then discusses the justifications for the Cadillac tax and its likely
impact on employer-sponsored health care plans.8 It then considers the criticisms of
the tax and proposed alternatives.9 Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the likely
future Cadillac tax.10
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010), as amended by
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L 111-152, 124 Stat 1029.
2 IRC § 4980I.
3 For a discussion of the reason why it is referred to as the Cadillac tax, see § 8.05[1], infra.
4 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub L 114-113, Div P § 101(a), 129 Stat 2242, 3037
(2015).
5 See § 8.04[1], infra.
6 See § 8.07, infra.
7 See § 8.02, infra.
8 See §§ 8.03 & 8.04, infra.
9 See §§ 8.05 & 8.06, infra.
10 See § 8.07, infra.
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§ 8.02 OVERVIEW OF THE CADILLAC TAX
[1] In General
Currently scheduled to go into effect in 2020,11 the so-called Cadillac tax imposes
a 40 percent excise tax on any “excess benefit” provided to an employee.12 An excess
benefit is defined as the excess, if any, of the aggregate cost of the applicable coverage
of the employee over the applicable dollar limit for the employee.13 For purposes of
the Cadillac tax, the term employee includes “a former employee, surviving spouse, or
other primary insured individual.”14
Generally, a health care plan qualifies as “applicable employer-sponsored coverage”
if the value of coverage is excludable from the employee’s income under section 106
of the Internal Revenue Code.15 The cost of coverage is generally to be determined
under rules that are similar to the rules that apply for purposes of COBRA continuation
coverage.16
There are generally two different applicable dollar amounts for purposes of
determining the Cadillac tax: (a) a limit for self-only coverage, and (b) a limit for other
than self-only coverage.17 Several adjustments to these dollar amounts are permitted.18
The excise tax is imposed on the “coverage provider.”19 Who is the coverage
provider depends on the type of applicable coverage.20 For example, the excise tax is
imposed on the “health insurance issuer” if the applicable coverage is provided under
an insured plan,21 and the excise tax is imposed on the employer if the applicable
coverage consists of contributions to an HSA.22
[2] Definition of Applicable Coverage
Generally, “applicable coverage” is defined as employer-sponsored health care
11 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub L 114-113, Div P §§ 101(a), 129 Stat 2242, 3037
(2015) (extending effective date).
12 IRC § 4980I.
13 IRC § 4980I(b).
14 IRC § 4980I(d)(3).
15 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(A).
16 IRC § 4980I(d)(2)(A).
17 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(i).
18 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(ii)–(v).
19 IRC § 4980I(c)(1).
20 IRC § 4980I(c)(2).
21 IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(A).
22 IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(B).
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coverage if the value of coverage is excludable from the employee’s income under
section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code.23 Because the term group health plan is
defined by reference to IRC § 5000(b), applicable coverage includes not only coverage
under a traditional insured plan but also coverage under a self-insured plan.24 In
addition, applicable coverage includes contributions to fund health flexible spending
accounts (FSAs),25 health savings accounts (HSAs),26 and health reimbursement
accounts (HRAs).27 Applicable coverage also includes an employee’s contributions to
fund health insurance premiums28 as well as a self-employed individual’s health
insurance coverage if a deduction for the cost of coverage is allowed.29
A few types of coverage are explicitly excluded from the definition of applicable
coverage.30 For example, applicable coverage does not include long-term care
coverage31 and stand-alone dental and vision coverage.32
[3] Determining Cost of Applicable Coverage
The cost of applicable coverage is generally to be determined under rules that are
similar to the rules that apply for purposes of determining the applicable premium for
COBRA continuation coverage.33 Under COBRA, the “applicable premium” is typically
23 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(A).
24 See IRC § 4980((f)(4) (defining group health plan by reference to IRC § 5000(b)(1) which defines
group health plan to include a self-insured plan).
25 IRC § 4980I(d)(2)(B).
26 IRC § 4980I(d)(2)(B).
27 IRS Notice 2015-16, at 7 (stating that future guidance is expected to provide that HRAs qualify as
applicable coverage).
28 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(C).
29 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(D). For a complete list of the types of coverage included as applicable coverage,
see IRS Notice 2015-16, at 6–7; Annie L. Mach, Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health
Coverage: In Brief, Congressional Research Service Report R44147, at 3 Table 1 (March 24, 2016).
30 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(B).
31 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(B)(i).
32 IRC § 4980I(d)(1)(B)(ii). For a complete list of the types of coverage that are specifically excluded,
see IRS Notice 2015-16, at 7–10; Mach, supra note 29, at 3–4 Table 2.
33 IRC § 4980I(d)(2)(A).
COBRA requires an employer that sponsors a group health plan to give the plan’s “qualified
beneficiaries” the opportunity to elect “continuation coverage” under the plan when the beneficiaries
might otherwise lose coverage upon the occurrence of certain “qualifying events.” ERISA § 601. A plan
sponsor may charge the beneficiary up to 102 percent of the applicable premium for the first 18 months
of continuation coverage and up to 150 percent thereafter. ERISA § 602(3). For an overview of COBRA,
see Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 89 Nebraska L. Rev. 885, 899–900 (2011); Lawrence A. Frolik and Kathryn L.
Moore, Law of Employee Pension and Welfare Benefits 98–99 (3d ed. 2012).
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the cost to the plan of providing continuation coverage regardless of who usually pays for
the insurance benefit.34
[a] Similarly Situated Individuals
IRC § 4980B(f)(4) provides that the COBRA applicable premium is generally based
on the average cost of providing coverage for those covered under the plan who are
similarly situated rather than the cost of providing coverage based on the character-
istics of each individual. The COBRA regulations treat as similarly situated covered
employees, spouses of covered employee, or dependent children of covered employees
receiving coverage under the plan who are receiving that coverage for a reason other
than COBRA and who are most similarly situated to the situation of the qualified
beneficiary immediately before the qualifying event.35
According to Notice 2015-16, Treasury and the IRS anticipate applying a similar
standard to the Cadillac tax. Under the anticipated approach, employees would be
determined by beginning with all employees covered by an employer’s particular
benefit package, then using mandatory disaggregation rules to subdivide the group,
and then permitting further subdivision under permissive disaggregation rules.36
The proposed approach would begin by aggregating all employees covered by an
employer’s particular benefit package. Benefit packages would be distinguished based
upon differences in health plan coverage, and employees would be grouped by the
benefit packages in which they are enrolled rather than by the benefit packages in
which they are offered. For example, if employees were offered an HMO option and
a PPO option, employees electing the HMO option would be grouped separately from
employees electing the PPO option.37
Mandatory disaggregation rules would then disaggregate employees based on
whether the employee is enrolled in self-only or other than self-only coverage. With
respect to employees enrolled in other than self-only coverage, Treasury and the IRS
are considering an approach under which employers would not be required to
determine the cost of other than self-only coverage based on the number of individuals
covered. Instead, employers could treat all employees with other than self-only
coverage similarly situated regardless of the number of individuals covered.38
Treasury and the IRS are considering providing for permissive disaggregation rules
34 ERISA § 604. For a discussion of the issues and potential guidance with respect to HRAs, see
Notice 2015-16, at 18–20.
35 Treas Reg § 54.4980B-3, Q&A-3.
36 Notice 2015-16, at 13.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 13–14.
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that would permit, but not require, employers to further subdivide groups of employees
based on (1) a broad standard (such as limiting permissive disaggregation to bona fide
employment-related criteria, such as nature of compensation, while prohibiting criteria
related to health), or (2) a more specific standard. More specific standards could
include disaggregation based on status as current versus former employee and/or bona
fide geographic distinctions.39
[b] Self-Insured Methods
IRC § 4980B(f)(4)(B) establishes two methods for self-insured plans to determine
the applicable COBRA premium: (1) the actuarial basis method, and (2) the past cost
method. A plan must use the actuarial basis method unless the plan administrator elects
to use the past cost method and the plan is eligible to use the past cost method.
Treasury and the IRS are concerned about the potential of abuse if a plan frequently
switches between the two different methods. Accordingly, Treasury and the IRS are
considering adopting rules for purposes of both COBRA and the Cadillac tax that
would generally require a plan to use the same valuation method for at least five
years.40
With respect to the actuarial basis method, Treasury and the IRS are considering
whether to adopt a broad standard under which the cost of applicable coverage for a
group of similarly situated individuals for purposes of the Cadillac tax would be equal
to a reasonable estimate of the cost of providing coverage under the plan for
individuals in that group using reasonable actuarial principles and practices. Under this
standard, a cost estimate would be based on the actual cost the plan is expected to incur
rather than the minimum or maximum exposure the plan could have for that period.41
With respect to the past cost method, IRC § 4980B(f)(4)(B)(ii) directs a plan
electing to use the past cost method to determine the COBRA applicable premium
based on the cost to the plan for similarly situated beneficiaries for the same period
occurring during the preceding 12-month determination period with adjustments under
IRC § 4980B(f)(4)(B)(ii)(II). For purposes of both COBRA and the Cadillac tax,
Treasury and the IRS are considering issuing guidance that would permit plans to use
as the 12-month determination period any 12-month period ending not more than 13
months before the beginning of the current determination period.42 The measurement
39 Id. at 14.
40 Id. at 16.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 17. For example, a plan could use the determination period ending one year before the current
determination period or it could use a measurement period beginning 18 months before and ending six
months before the beginning of the current determination period. Id.
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period would have to be applied consistently in the absence of bona fide business
reasons for changing the period.43
Treasury and the IRS anticipate proposing regulations that would describe the costs
that must be taken into account in computing costs under the past cost method. Those
costs could include (1) claims, (2) premiums for stop-loss or reinsurance policies, (3)
administrative expenses, and (4) reasonable overhead expenses. The costs could
include either claims incurred during the measurement period, regardless of whether
paid or unpaid, or claims submitted during the measurement period, regardless of
when incurred.44
[4] Applicable Dollar Limits
The excise tax is assessed on the aggregate cost of “applicable employer-sponsored
coverage” to the extent that it exceeds an applicable dollar limit.
There are two different basic dollar limits—one for employees with self-only coverage
and one for employees with coverage other than for self-only.45 Three additional
adjustments to the limits are permitted: (1) an age and gender adjustment; (2) an
adjustment for qualified retirees; and (3) an adjustment for high risk professions.46
[a] Basic Dollar Limits
The per-employee basic threshold dollar limits for 2018 (when the excise tax was
originally scheduled to go into effect) were set to be $10,200 per employee for
self-only coverage and $27,500 per employee for employees with other than self-only
coverage,47 as adjusted by a health cost adjustment percentage.48 For taxable years
after 2018, the baseline limits are adjusted for increases in the cost of living.49
The Congressional Research Service estimates that, due to increases in the cost of
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C).
46 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iii)–(iv).
47 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C).
48 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(ii). The health cost adjustment percentage is a one-time upward adjustment
that increases the dollar limits to the extent that the 2018 per-employee cost under the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield standard option under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan exceeds the 2010 cost by more
than 55 percent. Id. At this point it appears unlikely that there will be an adjustment under this provision.
See Mach, supra note 29, at 5 n.20 (noting that premium growth between 2010 and 2015 was about 20
percent for both single and family coverage options and that premium growth for 2016 through 2018
would have to be significantly higher than in recent years for growth over the entire period to exceed 55
percent).
49 IRC § 4980(b)(3)(C)(v). Specifically, they are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index for all Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) plus 1 percent. Mach, supra note 29, at 5.
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living, the limits in 2020 will be about $10,800 for self-only coverage and $29,100 for
coverage other than self-only.50
[b] Age and Gender Adjustment
Although the Affordable Care imposes restrictions on rating based on age and
gender in the individual and small group market,51 the actual cost of health care
coverage generally differs based on age and gender.52 On average, younger individuals
have lower health care costs than older individuals, and younger men have lower
health care costs than younger women. Thus, an upward adjustment in the dollar limits
is permitted if the age and gender characteristics of all employees of an employer are
significantly different from the age and gender characteristics of the national
workforce.53 Specifically, the dollar limit will be increased by the amount by which the
premium cost of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit option under the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan if priced for the age and gender characteristics of all
employees of an individual’s employer (employer premium cost) exceeds the premium
cost for providing this coverage if priced for the age and gender characteristics of the
national workforce (national premium cost).54
[c] Qualified Retiree Adjustment
A second adjustment is permitted for qualified retirees. Specifically, an additional
amount is added to the dollar limits for an individual who is a “qualified retiree.”55 A
“qualified retiree” is defined as any individual who (A) is receiving coverage by reason
of being a retiree, (B) has attained age 55, and (C) is not entitled to benefits or eligible
to enroll in Medicare.56 Under this adjustment, the dollar limit for self-only coverage
is increased by $1,650, and the dollar limit for coverage other than self-only is
increased by $3,450.57
[d] High-Risk Profession Adjustment
Finally, a third adjustment is provided for high risk professions. Specifically, an
additional amount is added to the threshold dollar limits for an individual “who
50 Mach, supra note 29, at 5.
51 See 42 USC § 300gg(a).
52 Notice 2015-52, at 13.
53 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iii).
54 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iii)(II). In Notice 2015-52, Treasury and the IRS proposed methods they are
considering to establish the age and gender distribution of the national workforce and that of a particular
employer. Notice 2015-52, at 13–15.
55 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iv).
56 IRC § 4980I(f)(2).
57 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iv).
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participates in a plan sponsored by an employer the majority of whose employees
covered by the plan are engaged in a high-risk profession or employed to repair or
install “electrical or telecommunication lines.”58 High-risk professions are defined as
(1) law enforcement officers, (2) employees in fire protection activities, (3) individuals
who provide out-of-hospital emergency medical care, (4) individuals whose primary
work is longshore work, and (5) individuals engaged in the construction, mining,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries.59 It also includes certain retirees from
high-risk professions. Like the adjustment for qualified retirees, under the adjustment
for high risk professions, the dollar limit for self-only coverage is increased by $1,650,
and the dollar limit for coverage other than self-only is increased by $3,450.60
[5] Coverage Provider
The excise tax is imposed on the entity providing the applicable coverage, that is,
the “coverage provider.”61 Who is the coverage provider depends on the type of
applicable coverage.62
For applicable coverage provided under an insured group plan, the coverage
provider is the health insurance issuer.63 For coverage under an HSA or Archer MSA,
the coverage provider is the employer.64 For all other applicable coverage, the
coverage provider is the person that administers the plan benefits.65
The statute does not define the term “person that administers the plan benefits.” It
does, however, provide that the “person that administers the plan benefits” includes the
plan sponsor if the plan sponsor administers benefits under the plan.66 According to
Treasury and the IRS, this provision indicates that in some, but not all, instances, the
plan sponsor of a self-funded plan may be the person that administers the benefits.67
Because the term “person that administers the plan benefits” is not defined, Treasury
and the IRS announced that they are considering two alternative approaches to
determining the identity of the person that administers the plan benefits. Under the first
approach, the person that administers the plan benefits would be the person that is
58 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iv).
59 IRC § 4980I(f)(2).
60 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iv).
61 IRC § 4980I(c)(1).
62 IRC § 4980I(c)(2).
63 IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(A).
64 IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(B).
65 IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(C).
66 IRC § 4980I(f)(6).
67 Notice 2015-52, at 3–4.
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responsible for the day-to-day administration of the plan, such as receiving and
processing benefit claims. They anticipate that in most instances, this person would be
a third party plan administrator. Under the second approach, the person that
administers the plan would be the person that has the ultimate authority or
responsibility with respect to plan administration, regardless of whether that person
routinely exercises authority or responsibility. They anticipate that this person would
be identifiable based on the terms of the plan documents and would often not be the
person that performs the day-to-day administrative functions under the plan.68
An employee’s applicable coverage may be provided by more than one coverage
provider. For example, an employee may have coverage through a traditional insured
plan as well as an FSA. If there are multiple coverage providers, each coverage
provider is responsible for paying its applicable share of the excise tax.69 A coverage
provider’s applicable share is based on the cost of the coverage provider’s applicable
coverage in relation to the aggregate cost of all of the employee’s applicable
coverage.70
Generally, the employer is responsible for calculating the aggregate amount of
applicable coverage that exceeds the applicable threshold and determining each
coverage provider’s applicable share of the excise tax.71 The employer must notify the
Secretary of Treasury and each coverage provider of the amount of the excise tax.72
[6] Deductibility
Initially, the excise tax was not deductible.73 The law, however, was amended in
2015 to make the excise tax deductible.74 Making the tax deductible softens its impact.
It effectively changes the tax rate from 40 percent to 26 percent for businesses subject
to the corporate income tax.75 The rate remains 40 percent for tax-exempt entities
subject to the Cadillac tax.
68 Id. at 4–5.
69 IRC § 4980I(c)(1).
70 IRC § 4980I(c)(3).
71 IRC § 4980I(c)(4)(A)(i). In the case of a multiemployer plan, the plan sponsor must make the
calculation. IRC § 4980(c)(4)(B).
72 IRC § 4980I(c)(4)(A)(ii).
73 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L 111-148 § 9001(a), 124 Stat 119, 853 (2010)
(adding IRC § 4980I(f)(10) which provided “[f]or denial of a deduction for the tax imposed by this
section, see section 275(a)(6)”).
74 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub L 114-113, Div P § 102, 129 Stat 2242, 3037
(2015) (amending IRC § 4980I(f)(1) to provide that IRC “[§] 275(a) shall not apply to the tax imposed
by section (a)”).
75 The corporate tax is currently generally imposed at the rate of 35 percent. See IRC § 11(b)(1)(D).
Thus, the effective rate of the Cadillac tax is the Cadillac tax rate (40%) decreased by amount of income
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[7] Example
To illustrate the operation of the Cadillac tax, assume that the limits, adjusted for
increases in the cost of living as projected by the Congressional Research Service, are
$10,800 for self-only coverage and $29,100 for other than self-only coverage. Assume
that Employer offers (1) three insured health plans with annual premiums ranging from
$8,000 to $13,000 for self-only coverage, (2) a health flexible spending account to
which employees may contribute up to $2,500, and (3) a stand-alone dental plan with
annual premiums of $1,000 for self-only coverage.
If Employee A, a single employee, selects self-only coverage from the highest cost
health plan, contributes $2,500 to a health flexible spending account, and dental
coverage under the stand-alone dental plan, the cost of her coverage will be $15,500
for purposes of the Cadillac tax. The entire $13,000 premium on the health plan will
be included, regardless of whether the employer, the employee, or both paid for the
premiums as will the entire $2,500 contribution to the health flexible spending account
($13,000 + $2,500 = $15,500). The $1,000 premium for the stand-alone dental plan
will be disregarded.
Because the $15,500 total cost of coverage exceeds the $10,800 threshold by $4,700
($15,500 − $10,800 = $4,700), A’s health care coverage will be subject to an excise tax
of $1,800 ($4,700 × 40% = $1,880.) The excise is imposed on the coverage provider,
which is the health insurance issuer in the case of the insured health plan, and the
person that administers the plan in the case of the health flexible spending account. The
health insurance issuer’s share is $1,577 ($1,800 × $13,000/$15,500) while the FSA
administrator’s share is $303 ($1,800 × $2,500/$15,500).
§ 8.03 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CADILLAC TAX
Two principle justifications are offered for the Cadillac tax.76 First, it is designed to
tax not paid as a result of deducting the Cadillac tax (35% x 40%) or 26%. Put another way, the following
formula applies: .40x – x(.35 x .40) = .26x.
To illustrate, suppose that an employee receives an excess benefit of $100. A Cadillac tax of $40 ($100
x .40) will be imposed on the excess benefit. The coverage provider’s income tax, however, will be
reduced by $40 x .35 or $14 because the coverage provider can deduct the Cadillac tax and thus will not
have to pay income tax on the $40 Cadillac tax. Accordingly, the effective tax on the excess benefit is
$40–$14 or $26 (which is equivalent to 26% of the $100 excess benefit).
76 See, e.g., Stephen Blakely, The Excise Tax on High-Cost Health Plans, 37 Employee Benefit
Research Institute Notes 1, 2 (No. 2 March 2016); Sean Lowry, The Excise Tax on High-Cost
Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage: Background and Economic Analysis, Congressional Research
Service Report R44160 1, 1 (Aug. 20, 2015). An infamous youtube video of MIT economics professor
Jonathan Gruber, who provided advice in the crafting of the Affordable Care Act, provides insights into
the structure and purposes of the Cadillac tax. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ytys-hbsFrA.
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raise revenues. Second, it is intended to reduce health care spending by taxing a portion
of the cost of comprehensive benefits.77
[1] Raising Revenues
When the Affordable Care Act was signed into law, its coverage provisions were
estimated to cost more than $900 billion from 2010 to 2019.78 Those costs were to be
financed by a number of fees and taxes imposed on both individuals and business,
including the Cadillac tax.79
How much the Cadillac tax is likely to raise in revenues is subject to considerable
uncertainty and debate. At the time the Affordable Care was enacted, the Congressio-
nal Budget Office (CBO) and Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the
Cadillac tax would raise about $30 billion in revenue in its first two years of
operation—2018 through 2019.80
Revenue estimates have been significantly reduced since then. In April 2014, the
CBO and JCT estimated that the Cadillac tax would raise $5 billion in fiscal year 2018,
then the first year it was scheduled to go into effect, and would raise $120 billion in
revenue over the first seven years of its implementation.81 By March 2015, the CBO
and JCT further reduced their estimates of the revenue-raising potential of the Cadillac
tax. Specifically, they estimated that the tax would raise $87 billion over its first eight
years of implementation (then scheduled to be from 2018 to 2025).82
The reduction in revenue estimates is largely due to the fact that inflation and the
rate of increases in health insurance premiums has slowed.83 Thus, fewer employers
77 Sometimes a third justification, closely related to the second, is offered. Specifically, it is sometimes
argued that the tax will reduce extravagant health care spending and thus promote fairness. For an
illustration of the operation of the Cadillac tax, see Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer
Health Plans, 65 Tax L Rev 749, 753 (2012); Julie Piotrowski, Excise Tax on ‘Cadillac’ Plans. To slow
growing costs and finance expanded coverage, the ACA imposes an excise tax on high-cost health plans
to take effect in 2018, Health Affairs Policy Brief 1, 3 (Sept. 12, 2013).
78 See Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 2.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Lowry, supra note 76, at 7.
82 Id. at 7. The increased revenue is expected to come from both the excise tax and increases in taxable
income that will arise as employers reduce the amount of health coverage they offer employees to avoid
the excise tax, with most (75 percent) of the revenue arising from increases in taxable income. See CBO,
Updated Estimates of the Net Budgetary Effects of the Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act
13 (April 2014).
83 Michelle Long et al., Recent Trends in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 315 J Am
Med Assn 18 (No. 1 Jan. 5, 2016).
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are expected to be subject to the tax.84
[2] Reducing Health Care Spending
Section 106(a) of the Internal Revenue Code generally excludes from an employee’s
income employer contributions to fund health care benefits.85 In addition, if an
employer establishes a cafeteria plan under IRC § 125,86 the employee may also pay
its required contributions for coverage with pre-tax income, that is, income that is not
subject to income tax.
Although the employee is not taxed on the value of these contributions, the
employer may generally deduct its share of contributions as an ordinary business
expense.87 In addition, both employer and employee contributions to fund health care
benefits are exempt from Social Security taxes88 and federal unemployment taxes.89
The Joint Committee on Taxation has identified the income tax exclusion for
employer contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term care
insurance premiums90 as the largest tax expenditure91 for the fiscal year 2014, with an
estimated loss of $143 billion in tax revenue in 2014 alone.92
This tax preference has been subject to a great deal of criticism. Critics contend that
it is inequitable because (1) individuals who do not have employment-based health
insurance do not benefit from the tax exclusion,93 and (2) the tax exclusion is more
84 Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 4.
85 For a history of the favorable tax treatment accorded health insurance, see Moore, supra note 33,
at 889-91; Lowry, supra note 76, at 4.
86 Cafeteria plans permit employers to offer employees the choice between cash and a variety of
nontaxable benefits without requiring employees to be subject to tax on the nontaxable benefits under the
constructive receipt doctrine. For an overview of cafeteria plans, see Kathryn L. Moore, Understanding
Employee Benefits Law 123–28 (2015).
87 IRC § 162; Treas Reg § 1.162.10(a).
88 IRC §§ 3121(a)(2).
89 IRC § 3306(b)(2).
90 The exclusion for employer-provided coverage under accident and health plans and the exclusion
for benefits employees receive under employer-provided accident and health plans are viewed as a single
tax expenditure. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2014–2018, JCS-97-14, at 3 n.8.
91 Tax expenditures are defined as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability. Id. at 2.
92 Id. at 38. The tax expenditure for fiscal years 2014-2018 is estimated to be $785.1 billion. Id. Table
I, at 19.
93 To illustrate:
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valuable for higher-income workers than it is for lower-income workers.94 Moreover,
critics contend that the tax exclusion creates an incentive to purchase too much health
insurance which distorts the health services market, causes inefficient allocations of
scarce resources, and inflates health care costs.95
This third, “overinsurance,” argument originated with Martin Feldstein in the
[A]ssume that Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B desire the same insurance coverage, an individual policy
that costs $3,750. Taxpayer A is offered her desired coverage through her employer, while Taxpayer
B is not. Both taxpayers are in the 25% marginal rate bracket. Taxpayer A needs to earn only $3,750
in wages to purchase such coverage. Taxpayer B, however, must earn $5,000 in wages to have
sufficient after-tax funds available for his purchase. If we take into account payroll taxes of 7.65%
and an assumed state income tax rate of 5%, the amount of wages necessary to pay for a $3,750
policy rises to $5,162. Under these assumptions, Taxpayer A receives an effective subsidy of $1,412
to purchase her health insurance coverage, solely because her employer makes such coverage
available to her, and regardless of whether her employer makes any contribution toward such
coverage.
Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Relationship between Taxes and Health Insurance, in Beyond Economic
Efficiency in United States Tax Law 137, 140 (David A. Brennen et al., eds. 2013).
94 To illustrate:
Assume that Employer offers its two employees, Candece and Dirk, identical health insurance
coverage. Candece and Dirk both pay $1,000 toward the cost of coverage while their Employer
contributes $5,000 toward the cost of coverage. Candece is in the 33% marginal rate bracket while Dirk
is in the 25% marginal rate bracket. Because Candece is in a higher marginal rate bracket, the tax
exclusion is more valuable to Candece than to Dirk. Specifically, Candece receives a subsidy of $1,980
($5,000 x .33 = $1,980) (that is, she avoids paying $1,980 in tax) while Dirk only receives a subsidy of
$1,250 ($5,000 x .25 = $1,250).
According to 2009 Joint Committee on Taxation estimates, households with annual earnings between
$200,000 and $499,999 receive on average tax benefits of $4,728 while households with annual earnings
between $10,000 and $29,999 receive on average tax benefits of $1,952 due to the exclusion. See Joint
Committee on Taxation, Background material for Senate Committee on Finance roundtable on health care
financing, presented before the Senate Committee on Finance 5 (JCX-27-09 May 8, 2009).
Focusing on the subsidy as a percentage of family income, Steffie Woolhandler and David Himmelstein
argue that the tax subsidy is most helpful for families with income between $38,550 and $100,000. Steffie
Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein, The “Cadillac Tax” on Health Benefits in the United States Will
Hit the Middle Class the Hardest: Refuting the Myth That Health Benefit Tax Subsidies are Regressive,
Intl J of Health Services 3 (2016).
95 See Stan Dorn, Urban Institute, Capping the Tax Exclusion of Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance: Is Equity Feasible 1 (2009); Paul Fronstin, Capping the Tax Exclusion for Employment-Based
Health Coverage: Implications for Employer and Workers, Employee Benefits Research Institute Issue
Brief No. 325, at 5 (Jan. 2009); Bob Lyke, The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Insurance:
Policy Issues Regarding the Repeal Debate, Congressional Research Service Report RL 34767 12-14
(2008); John D. Banja, The Improbable Future of Employment-Based Insurance, Hasting Center Rep. 17
(May–Jun 2000); William S. Custer et al., Why We Should Keep the Employment-Based Health Insurance
System, 18 Health Affairs 115, 119 (1999).
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1970s.96 In essence, the argument goes, because employees pay taxes on wages, but
not on compensation provided in the form of health care benefits, employers have an
incentive to skew compensation toward tax-free health care benefits and away from
taxable wages.97
To illustrate, suppose that an employee has a marginal tax rate of 33 percent. At the
margin, because wages are taxed and employer contributions to fund health care are
not, employers may offer the employee either $1 in health insurance or $0.67 in
after-tax wages. In order to take advantage of this tax differential, a rational employer
would “overinsure” and offer a plan with generous benefits and limited cost-sharing98
rather than additional wages.99
This overinsurance, in turn, exacerbates the moral hazard that already arises from
having insurance in the first.100 Moral hazard refers to the tendency of an individual
to behave differently depending on whether or not the individual has insurance.101
Specifically, in the case of health insurance, an individual is more likely to use health
care services if the services are paid for with insurance than if the individual directly
pays for the cost of the services.102
Proponents of the Cadillac tax contend that by taxing “excess benefits,” the Cadillac
tax will encourage employers to stop offering excess benefits and instead offer
employees less generous plans.103 With less generous plans, employees will be forced
to pay a larger percentage of their medical expenses, and this demand-side incentive
96 See Jon Gabel, et al., Taxing Cadillac Health Plans May Produce Chevy Results, 29 Health Affairs
174, 174 (No. 1 Jan. 2010), citing Martin S. Feldstein, The welfare loss of excess health insurance, 81 J
Political Econ 251 (No. 2 1973).
97 See Jason Furman, Next Steps for Health Care Reform, The Hamilton Project 17 (Oct. 7, 2015),
citing Martin S. Feldstein, The welfare loss of excess health insurance, 81 J Political Econ 251 (No. 2
1973), and Martin Feldstein, The Rising Price of Physicians’ Services, 52 Review of Economics and
Statistics 121 (No. 2 1970).
98 As Amy Monahan has noted, the tax preference also encourages plans with limited cost-sharing
because premiums can be paid with tax-free dollars while other medical expenses must generally be paid
for with after-tax dollars. Although flexible spending accounts permit employees to pay for some
out-of-pocket expenses with tax-free dollars, contributions to flexible spending accounts are limited and
subject to the “use it or lose it” rule. Monahan, supra note 77, at 760. For a more detailed discussion of
flexible spending accounts, see Moore, supra note 86, at 124–27.
99 See Gabel, et al., supra note 96, at 174.
100 Monahan, supra note 77, at 759.
101 Douglas Farnsworth, Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Are Consumer-Directed Plans the
Answer?, 15 Annals of Health Law 251, 253 (2006).
102 Id. at 254; Monahan, supra note 70, at 759.
103 Furman, supra note 97, at 17.
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will result in a lower demand for health services which will reduce national health care
expenditures.104
A Congressional Research Service Report estimates that the Cadillac tax could
reduce national health expenditures by as much as $7–11 billion in 2018 (its first
effective year at the time of the report) and by as much as $41–60 billion in 2024.105
§ 8.04 LIKELY EFFECT OF THE CADILLAC TAX ON EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH CARE PLANS
Assuming it goes into effect as scheduled in 2020, the Cadillac tax is likely to hit some
employers that year. Just how many is subject to debate. What is clear is that many
employers are likely to amend their plans to avoid paying the tax.
[1] How Many Employers Might be Subject to the Cadillac Tax?
In August 2015, the Kaiser Family Foundation issued a brief estimating the share of
employers offering health benefits that could expect to reach the Cadillac tax
thresholds in 2018, 2023, and 2028 if plan premiums were to grow at a range of
reasonable rates.106 The brief did not attempt to assess the share of employer plans that
would actually be subject to the tax because the authors recognized that many
employers are likely to amend their plans to avoid the tax.107 The brief offered two
different sets of general estimates. One looked solely at the costs for plan premiums
plus employer contributions to HSAs and HRAs. The second took into account
contributions to FSAs as well. Not surprisingly, the estimates were much higher when
FSA contributions were taken into account.
Looking solely at costs for plan premiums plus employer contributions to HSAs and
HRAs, about 16 percent of employers offering health benefits were estimated to have
at least one plan exceed the Cadillac tax threshold for self-only coverage in 2018, with
the percentage increasing to 22 percent in 2023 and to 36 percent in 2028.108 Adding
FSA contributions increased the estimates to 26 percent of employers in 2018 and
rising to 30 percent in 2023, and 42 percent in 2028.109
In August 2015, the Congressional Research Service released a set of estimates on
104 Monahan, supra note 77, at 753, citing Jonathan Gruber, The Cost Implications of Health Care
Reform, 362 New Eng J Med 2050, 2051 (2010).
105 Jane G. Gravelle, The Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Estimated
Economic and Market Effects, Congressional Research Service Report R44159 5–6 (Aug. 20, 2015).
106 Gary Claxton & Larry Levitt, How Many Employers Could be Affected by the Cadillac Plan Tax?,
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Issue Brief (Aug. 2015).
107 Id. at 3.
108 Id. at 4.
109 Id. at 4–5.
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the share of plans with premiums that could exceed the Cadillac tax threshold.110 Like
the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Congressional Research Service did not consider
any plan changes employers might make to avoid the tax.111 Unlike the Kaiser Family
Foundation, the Congressional Research Service only considered insurance premiums
and did not take into account other types of coverage, such as contributions to HSAs
and FSAs, in reaching its estimates.112
Looking only at premiums, the Congressional Research Report estimated that on a
national level,113 about 10 percent of plans providing single coverage could be subject
to the tax in 2018 while about 6 percent of plans with other than single coverage could
be subject to the tax that year.114 Assuming low premium growth rate, the report
estimated that the share of plans with single coverage that could be subject to the tax
would increase to 24.7 percent in 2028, and to 19 percent in 2028 for plans with other
than single coverage.115
According to estimates by the Department of Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, seven
percent of individuals enrolled in employer-sponsored plans will be in plans subject to
the tax in 2020, assuming employers make no adjustments to avoid the tax.116
Recognizing that the tax does not apply to all premiums in plans subject to the tax but
instead only applies to the premiums that exceed the threshold, the Office of Tax
Analysis estimates that only about one percent of plan costs are expected to be affected
in 2020, and the proportion is projected increase to four percent by 2026.117
110 Lowry, supra note 76, at 8–14.
111 Id. at 8.
112 Id. at 9.
113 The Report provides maps with estimates for each individual state. Id. at 11 & 12 Figures 1 & 2.
114 Id. at 10.
115 Lowry, supra note 76, at 12–14.
116 Jason Furman and Matthew Fiedler, The Cadillac Tax—A Crucial Tool for Delivery-System
Reform, New England J Medicine 1008, 1008 (March 17, 2016). For additional studies and surveys, see
Lowry, supra note 76, at 23–24; Edward D. Kaplan, Prepare to Avoid or Delay the Affordable Care Act
Excise Tax, HR News Magazine 6, 7 (Jan. 2016) (reporting that according to Segal Consulting estimates,
31 percent of plans would be subject to the tax in 2018, 46 percent in 2022, and 70 percent in 2027);
Ascende, Not Your Father’s Cadillac: The Impact of the Cadillac Tax on the Energy Industry 2 (Dec.
2015) (estimating that health plans sponsored by as many as 44 percent of companies in the energy
industry could be subject to the Cadillac tax in 2018 with the number increasing to 89 percent in 2022);
Tevi D. Troy and D. Mark Wilson, ACA Excise Tax: Cutting Family Budgets, Not Health Care Budgets,
American Health Policy Institute 2 (2015), available at http://americanhealthpolicy.org/ (reporting that
over 30 percent of large employers said they would have at least one plan impacted by the Cadillac tax
in 2018 and almost half of employers that did not have any plans hitting the threshold in 2018 expected
to have a plan impacted by 2023).
117 Furman and Fielder, supra note 116, at 1008.
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Although analysts disagree about the precise number of health care plans that are
likely to be subject to the Cadillac tax and when, analysts uniformly agree that an
increasing number of employer-sponsored health care plans will be subject to the tax
over time. The reason why more plans will be subject to the tax over time is because
the adjustments to the thresholds are tied to increases in the consumer price index, and
medical costs have historically increased at a much faster rate than the consumer price
index. For example, while medical care prices increased at the relatively low rate of
2.4 percent in 2014, they still rose significantly faster than the 1.6 percent rate at which
all other prices rose.118 The American Health Policy Institute projects that the cost of
today’s “average plan” will reach the excise tax threshold by 2031.119
[2] How are Employers Likely to Respond to the Cadillac Tax?
Although the Cadillac tax is not scheduled to go into effect for several years,
employers have long been concerned about the tax. Indeed, according to a 2010 survey
by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, close to half of
respondents were focusing on redesigning their health plans to avoid the excise tax at
that time.120 More recently, in December 2015, Richard Stover, principal and
consulting actuary in Xerox HR Services’ Knowledge Resource Center, said that
employers “are generally doing and looking at everything they can do to avoid the
tax.”121
Consultants have recommended, and employers are considering and in some cases
have implemented, a variety of approaches to avoid the Cadillac tax.122
Some approaches are designed specifically to reduce overall health care expendi-
tures. Those approaches include adopting wellness programs and shifting toward
consumer-driven health care plans.123 Others shift the cost of health care to employees
118 Troy and Wilson, supra note 116, at 2–3.
119 Id. at 3.
120 Intl Foundation of Emp Benefit Plans, Health Care Reform: What Employers are Considering 33
(2010).
121 Blakely, supra note 76, at 7.
122 For a discussion of the range of options employers may consider, see Kaplan, supra note 116, at
7–9. See also Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 4–5 (discussing employers’ strategies to address Cadillac tax).
123 See National Business Group on Health, U.S. Employers Changing Health Benefit Plans to
Control Rising Costs, Comply with ACA, National Business Group on Health Survey Finds (Aug. 13,
2014), available at https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=234 (according
to a 2014 survey of about 400 large U.S. employers, 73% are adding or expanding tools to encourage
employees to be better health care consumers; 57% are implementing or expanding consumer-driven
health plans and 53 percent will either add or expand wellness programs); Aon Media Center, New Aon
Hewitt Survey Shows Majority of Companies Taking Immediate Steps to Minimize Exposure to Excise Tax
(Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://aon.mediaroom.com/2014-10-16-New-Aon-Hewitt-Survey-Shows-
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and thus reduce the cost of health care plans. Those approaches include imposing
higher deductibles, co-payments, and out-of-pocket maximums, and reducing spousal
subsidies.124
According to the Kaiser 2015 Employer Health Benefits Survey, 53 percent of large
firms (defined as employers with 200 or more employees) that offer health benefits
have conducted an analysis to determine if their health plans will exceed the Cadillac
tax thresholds.125 Of the large firms that have made changes in anticipation of the
Cadillac tax, 64 percent have increased cost sharing, 34 percent have moved benefit
options to account-based plans such as HRAs or HSAs,126 18 percent have increased
incentives to use less costly providers, and 10 percent have reduced the scope of
covered health services.127
Employers’ desire to restructure their health benefits to avoid the tax is hardly
surprising. Indeed, one of the justifications for the tax is premised on the belief that the
tax will encourage employers to offer less generous benefits.128 Moreover, the other
justification for the tax, increased revenues, also contemplates that employers will
reduce health benefits. Specifically, proponents of the tax expect that the reduction in
benefits will be offset by an increase in taxable wages. Indeed, the offsetting increase
in taxable wages is expected to account for 75 percent of the projected revenues from
the tax.129
§ 8.05 CRITICISMS OF THE CADILLAC TAX
Analysts have raised two significant criticisms to the Cadillac tax. First, they contend
Majority-of-Companies-Taking-Immediate-Steps-to-Minimize-Exposure-to-Excise-Tax (reporting that 31
percent of employers that have determined impact of Cadillac tax are increasing the use of wellness
options in their plans). For a discussion of Booz Allen Hamilton’s multi-faceted approach to addressing
the Cadillac tax which included launching a wellness campaign and adopting a wholesale redesign of their
health benefits to include consumer-driven health plans and HSAs, see Blakely, supra note 76, at 6–7.
124 Aon Media Center, supra note 123 (reporting that 33 percent of employers that have determined
impact of Cadillac tax are reducing the richness of their plan designs by imposing higher out-of-pocket
costs and 14 percent are significantly reducing spousal eligibility or subsidies through mandates or
surcharges).
125 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits,
2015 Annual Survey Exhibit 14.16.
126 Cf. Sherry A. Glied and Adam Striar, Looking Under the Hood of the Cadillac Tax, Common-
wealth Fund Pub. 1880 (June 2016) (speculating that employers are initially likely to respond to the
Cadillac tax by limiting contributions to FSAs and HSAs).
127 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research 7 Educational Trust, supra note 125, at Exhibit
14.15.
128 See § 8.03[2], infra.
129 CBO, Updated Estimates of the Net Budgetary Effects of the Coverage Provisions of the
Affordable Care Act 13 (April 2014).
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that the tax is flawed because cost is not a proxy for luxury. Second, they contend that it
could have an adverse impact on vulnerable workers.
[1] Cost is Not a Proxy for Luxury (or Sometimes a Cadillac is Just a
Chevy)
The term “Cadillac” in the so-called Cadillac tax refers to the American automobile
that has long been synonymous with luxury.130 The tax is imposed on “Cadillac”
health care plans which have the highest premiums131 and thus are assumed to offer
the most generous benefits.132
Some critics of the tax are sympathetic to the desire of targeting “luxurious” health
care benefits.133 They contend, however, that cost is not a proxy for luxury and the tax
is too “blunt” an instrument.134
Jon Gabel, Jeremy Pickreign, Roland McDevitt, and Thomas Briggs analyzed data
from the 2007 Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust
Employer Benefits Survey and found that only a small part of the variation in premium
costs is related to the actuarial value of benefits or even plan design. Specifically, they
found that less than four percent of the variation in premiums was attributable to
actuarial value, and taking plan type into account only increased that figure to six
percent.135 They found that industry and geographic variations were more highly
correlated with cost than actuarial value or plan design.136 Thus, in their view, cost
should not be equated with luxury. Simply targeting cost “could exacerbate rather than
130 See Eleanor Hagan, Sometimes that Cadillac is a Lemon: Why the High-Cost Health Insurance
Excise Tax Needs a Tune-Up Before Implementation, 66 Tax Law. 251 n.26 (2012) (noting that “[i]ts
metaphor in the health care industry began in the 1970s and was popularized during the debate on
universal health care in the 1990s.”).
131 For a discussion of how premiums are calculated, see Robert H. Dobson and Stuart D. Rachlin,
What does the ACA excise tax on high-cost plans actually tax?, Milliman Client Report 8–9 (Dec. 9,
2014).
132 Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 2 (stating that [t]hese plans may also have less restrictions on or
wider provider networks and wide menus of covered health services to choose from, including even the
most expensive services such as in vitro fertilization, which can run tens of thousands of dollars”).
133 See e.g., Joseph White, Reform The “Cadillac Tax” to Target Rich Benefits, Not High Costs,
Health Affairs Blog (March 16, 2016), available at http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/16/reform-the-
cadillac-tax-to-target-rich-benefits-not-high-costs/.
134 Sarah Nowak and Christine Eibner, Rethinking the Affordable Care Act’s “Cadillac Tax”: A More
Equitable Way to Encourage “Chevy” Consumption, Commonwealth Fund Publication 1852, at 1 (Dec.
2015).
135 Gabel, supra note 96, at 180.
136 Id.
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ameliorate current inequities.”137
Sarah Nowak and Christine Eibner analyzed median premiums from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Companies on state measures of health care
costs, plan characteristics, workforce composition, and demographics from a variety of
sources. They found that “plan generosity” only accounted for 11 percent of the
variation in premiums. For these purposes, plan generosity was defined to include
deductibles and plan design, that is, whether the plan was an HMO. They found that
most of the factors that accounted for the differences in premiums was outside the
control of employers and their workers. Specifically, demographics, the share of
individuals working in the health care sector, industry, and regional differences in
health care costs accounted for 53 percent of the differences in premiums. Thirty-six
percent of the variation was unexplained.138
Nowak and Eibner found that workers in some states, such as Alaska, Connecticut,
and New Hampshire, are likely to be affected by the Cadillac tax much sooner than
workers in other states, such as Arizona, Idaho, and Michigan. They are concerned that
the Cadillac tax could have an adverse impact on low-income workers in those states
if they are faced with absorbing the tax or moving to a plan that requires very high
cost-sharing.139
The Cadillac tax’s current structure recognizes that cost is not always a proxy for
luxury.140 Specifically, it recognizes that premiums may be affected by such factors as
age, gender, and profession. Accordingly, it permits adjustments to the thresholds for
age and gender, qualified retirees, and high risk professions.141
A study by Milliman found that the age and gender adjustment appropriately
addresses the variations in premiums caused by age and gender differences.142 In
137 Id. at 180. See also Monahan, supra note 77, at 762 (discussing Gabel study and asserting that
“[t]here is reason to believe that there is significant noise in the premium level, and that it is not directly
correlated with plan generosity”).
138 Nowak and Eibner, supra note 134.
139 Id. at 4. They recognize that technically the Cadillac tax is imposed on the coverage provider and
not on the insured individuals. They note, however, that the costs could be passed onto workers in the
form of higher premium contributions or lower wages. Id. at 7 n.10.
140 Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that Cadillac plan costs are not always or fully explained
by the generosity in the level of their benefits; adjustments in the thresholds are permitted to account for
the variation in plan costs that may arise from differences in the age and gender of the workforce as well
as type of work).
141 IRC § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(iii)–(iv).
142 Dobson and Rachlin, supra note 130, at 12 & 21. Legislation enacted in December 2015 extending
the effective date of the Cadillac tax until 2020 includes a provision requiring the U.S. comptroller general
to work with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to conduct a study on whether the
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addition, the study found that the adjustment for high risk profession partially
mitigates for differences in premiums due to industry.143 Yet, like the other studies
discussed above, the study found that only a small percentage (about six percent) of
variations in premiums is due to benefit level.144 They found that the most significant
factor is geographical area with almost 70 percent of the variation in premiums due to
differences in geographical area.145 Thus, like the other studies, the Milliman study
confirms that cost is not an appropriate proxy for benefit level, and not all high-cost
plans are overly generous.
[2] Adverse Impact on Vulnerable Workers
Proponents of the Cadillac tax contend that the tax will result in higher wages for
employees. Pointing to standard economic theory, they contend that to the extent that
employers reduce their health benefits to avoid the tax, employers will pass the cost
savings on to employees in the form of higher wages.146 Indeed, the CBO and JCT
estimate that the Cadillac tax will result in an estimated $50 billion annual increase in
wages by 2026, and taxation on that projected increase in taxable wages accounts for
75 percent of the Cadillac tax’s projected revenue.147
Although economic theory supports the contention that employers will pass the
cost-savings on to employees in the form of higher wages, some critics of the Cadillac
tax question whether this will actually happen in practice.148 Some survey data
supports this view. Specifically, according to a June 2015 employer survey by the
American Health Policy Institute, 71 percent of respondents said that they probably
would not provide a corresponding wage increase to offset health benefit reductions.149
The authors reporting the survey results concede that given the current low
productivity-low inflation environment, taxable wages may increase in the long run as
Cadillac tax uses appropriate standards in determining age and gender adjustments to the tax thresholds.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub L 114-113, Div P § 103, 129 Stat 2242, 3037 (2015).
143 Dobson and Rachlin, supra note 130, at 14. According to the study, industry accounts for about
20 percent of the variation in premiums.
144 Id. at 3.
145 Id. at 3.
146 Furman, supra note 97, at 18. See also Letter to Chairman Hatch, Senator Wyden, Chairman Ryan,
and Congressman Levin (Oct. 1, 2015), available at http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
cadillac_tax_letter.pdf.
147 Furman and Fiedler, supra note 116, at 1009.
148 Cf. Jorge Castro, As Employers Try to Avoid the Cadillac Tax, Treasury And The IRS Need to Act,
Health Affairs Blog (May 12, 2015), available at http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/120as-employer-
try-to-avoid -the cadillac-tax-treasury-and-the-irs-need-to-act/ (describing the second possible scenario
arising from the Cadillac tax as “a reduction of employee benefits without a pay increase”).
149 Troy and Wilson, supra note 116, at 4.
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the CBO and JCT predict. They note, however, that wages are “sticky” in the short run,
and any long run wage increase may be invisible to employees because not only will
the wage increase be subject to tax but it may also be consumed in the form of higher
out-of-pocket health care costs.150
Other critics contend that even if employers do pass the savings from reduced health
care benefits on to employees in the form of higher wages, the higher out-of-pocket
costs could discourage some individuals, particularly lower-income individuals and
their families, from seeking needed health care151 and thus exacerbate the current
inequalities in health and health care.152 Studies show that when individuals move
from more generous health plans to less generous health plans, they often use less
health care—both needed and unneeded.153 Thus, according to these critics, the
Cadillac tax could lead to worse health outcomes for some individuals, particularly
lower-income individuals.154
Proponents of the Cadillac tax respond that employers are not likely to adopt higher
cost-sharing to the extent that many opponents of the Cadillac tax believe. Recogniz-
ing that employers use health benefits as an important tool for recruiting and retaining
workers, employers are likely to try to find the most attractive overall package for
employees. Instead of increasing cost-sharing, they are likely to focus on encouraging
more efficient care delivery by deploying innovative payment models, directly
complementing public-sector efforts, and finding creative ways to steer patients toward
150 Id.
151 Josh Bivens, Tax on Expensive Health Insurance Plans Could Cut Care Along with Costs, Wall
Street Journal (Oct. 2, 2015), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/10/02/excise-tax-on-
expensive-health-plans-could-cut-care-along-with-costs/; Piotrowski, supra note 77, at 4.
152 Woolhandler and Himmelstein, supra note 94, at 5.
153 See, e.g., Katherine Baicker and Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare Spending
Growth, 25 J of Econ Perspectives 47 (No. 2 2011); Melinda Beewkes Butnin, et al., Healthcare Spending
and Preventive Care in High-Deductible and Consumer-Directed Health Plans, 17 Am J of Managed
Care 222 (No. 3 2011). Kathleen N. Lohr, et al., Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment: Diagnosis- and service-specific analyses in a randomized controlled trial, 24 Med Care S1,
S31–S38 (9 Suppl 1986); RAND Health, The Health Insurance Experiment 2–4 (2006) http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9174.pdf. See also Katherine Baicker and
Amitabh Chandra, Myths and Misconceptions About U.S. Health Insurance: Health care reform is
hindered by confusion about how health insurance works, 27 Heath Affairs w533, w540 (Oct. 21, 2008)
(noting that there is evidence that patients underuse drugs with very high value when confronted with
greater cost sharing and even $5–$10 increases in copayments can result in increased hospitalizations).
154 Monahan, supra note 77, at 762–63. See also Nowak and Eibner, supra note 134, at 7 n.7 (noting
that “[a]n additional concern . . . is that higher cost-sharing could discourage both low-value and
high-value care, ultimately leading to worse health outcomes.”).
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more efficient providers.155
As Professor Amy Monahan has noted, the Cadillac tax proponents’ response is
appealing from a theoretical standpoint. One would, in theory, expect employers to be
effective agents for their employees and restructure their health plans to provide the
maximum benefit for their employees. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence on
the question as to how employers are likely to respond to the Cadillac tax. Moreover,
there are multiple reasons, including the very complexity of structuring health care
plans, why employers may not restructure their plans as precisely as one might
hope.156 Thus, there appears to be at least a realistic possibility that the Cadillac tax
could lead to worse health outcomes for some workers.
The Obama Administration appears to be sensitive to this concern. The President’s
fiscal year 2017 budget calls on the Government Accountability Office, in consultation
with the Treasury Department and other experts, to conduct a study of the potential
effects of the Cadillac tax on employers with unusually sick employees.157
§ 8.06 ALTERNATIVES TO THE CADILLAC TAX
Critics have offered a host of alternatives to current Cadillac tax. Some of the
proposals call for modest adjustments to the tax. Others call for wholesale change. This
section discusses three of the proposed alternatives.158
[1] Modest Adjustments to the Cadillac Tax
Some commentators have recommended that the Cadillac tax be amended to expand
the number of adjustments made to the tax thresholds. For example, some commen-
tators recommend that the adjustments for regional variation in price levels be
permitted as well as possibly for other factors, such as industry.159
The Obama Administration appears to be open to this suggestion. Indeed, the
155 Furman and Fiedler, supra note 116, at 1009. Amy Monahan describes this as a reasonable
theoretical argument but notes that there is little empirical evidence to either refute or support the
argument. Monahan, supra note 77, at 763–64.
156 Id. at 763–66.
157 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2017, at 60.
158 For a discussion of other alternatives, see, for example, Monahan, supra note 77, at 771–78;
Christopher Condeluci, Obamacare’s Cadillac tax Must Be Repealed: Former Senate tax counsel
Christopher Condeluci lays out a plan to replace the tax in a way that would meet both Democratic and
Republican policy goals, CFO.com (Nov. 18, 2015), available at http://ww2.cfo.com/tax/2015/11/
obamacares-cadillac-tax-must-repealed/.
159 Nowak and Eibner, supra note 134, at 6 (suggesting that safe harbor approach that would provide
that the Cadillac tax would not apply if a minimum-generosity plan were not available at a premium below
the Cadillac tax threshold and that minimum generosity be defined as a price equal to 60 to 70 percent
of actuarial plan value). Cf. Gabel, supra note 96, at 180 (critiquing proposed Cadillac tax and contending
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President’s fiscal year 2017 budget specifically provides for a geographic adjustment
to the Cadillac tax. Under the proposed adjustment, in any state in which the average
premium for “gold” coverage on the state’s individual health insurance marketplace
exceeds the current law Cadillac tax threshold, the threshold would be set at the level
of that average gold premium.160
[2] Limit Tax Preference to Deserving Benefits
According to at least one critic, modest modifications to the Cadillac tax thresholds
are not enough. Joseph White, Luxenberg Family Professor Public Policy in the
Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University, contends that the
Obama Administration’s proposed solution would only lead to an extremely compli-
cated set of adjustments that would inevitably be inadequate. He contends that the
fundamental problem with the Cadillac tax is that it aims at the wrong target.
White contends that policymakers need to focus on benefits rather than cost. Rather
than imposing an excise tax on plans that are too costly, the law should limit the tax
exclusion to benefits that are deserving of a tax exclusion. White recognizes that such
an approach faces its own set of difficulties. First, it is likely to raise less revenue than
the current Cadillac tax. Second, it will be hard to reach an agreement on which
benefits are not deserving of a tax exclusion. Nevertheless, he contends the likely
conflict that would arise from trying to identify deserving benefits is “otherwise known
as representative government. Voters should be given a chance to express their views
of what constitutes decent health insurance.”161
[3] Replace Cadillac Tax and Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance with Tax Credit for Health Care
Some commentators have recommended that the current system of tax exclusion for
employer-sponsored health care be replaced with a tax credit modelled on the
Affordable Care Act’s marketplace tax credits. Under the proposal, tax credits could
allow for adjustments based on the regional cost of health care, be scaled with income,
and be capped at 70 percent of actuarial plan value. Advocates of this approach
contend that it could insure more people than the Affordable Care Act at no additional
cost to the government.162 Its proponents, however, recognize that it could disrupt the
employer market and cause some employers to eliminate their health care coverage.
that analysts should not equate high cost with Cadillac plans but that other factors such as industry and
cost of medical inputs should be considered).
160 Office of Mgmt & Budget, supra note 157, at 60.
161 Joseph White, Reform The “Cadillac Tax” to Target Rich Benefits, Not High Costs, Health Affairs
Blog (March 16, 2016), available at http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/16/reform-the-cadillac-tax-to-
target-rich-benefits-not-high-costs/.
162 Nowak and Eibner, supra note 134, at 6.
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§ 8.07 LIKELY FUTURE OF THE CADILLAC TAX
Politically fraught since its inception, the Cadillac tax’s prognosis is guarded at
best.163
Economists are nearly unanimous in supporting the tax.164 For example, Larry
Summers, Secretary of the Treasury under President Bill Clinton, and Gregory
Mankiw, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President George W.
Bush, co-wrote an editorial for the New York Times praising the tax.165 Perhaps more
significantly, more than 100 health economists, “a virtual Who’s Who of both liberals
and conservatives in the field,”166 signed a letter to the Chairs and Ranking Members
of the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Ways and Means urging
Congress to take no action to weaken, delay, or reduce the Cadillac tax unless and until
it is replaced by an alternative tax that would more effectively curtail the growth in
health care costs.167
Few outside of economists, however, support the tax.168 For obvious reasons,
employers do not like the tax. It is designed to force them to cut back on health care
benefits, their most popular employee benefit.169 Insurers do not like the tax. Not only
are health insurance issuers directly subject to the tax but the tax puts pressure on them
to lower premiums. Labor unions do not like the tax. Indeed, they may be the fiercest
opponents of the tax. Many of the recipients of the best health care benefits are
unionized workers, and unions do not like the levy impeding their contract negotia-
tions.170
163 Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent,
Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls, 2010 NYU Rev of Employee Benefits and Exec Comp
7-1 7-25 (describing Cadillac tax’s prognosis as uncertain at best).
164 Woolhandler and Himmelstein, supra note 94, at 2.
165 N. Gregory Mankiw and Lawrence H. Summers, Uniting behind the divisive “Cadillac” tax on
health plans, New York Times (Oct. 24, 2015).
166 Woolhandler and Himmelstein, supra note 94, at 2.
167 Letter to Chairman Hatch, Senator Wyden, Chairman Ryan, and Congressman Levin, supra note
146.
168 But see New York Times Editorial, Keep the Tax on High-End Plans, NY Times A18 (Aug. 12,
2015).
169 See Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Views on the Value of Workplace Benefits: Findings from the
2015 Health and voluntary Workplace Benefits survey, 36 EBRI Notes No 11, at 2 (Nov. 2015)
(“reporting that [w]orkers overwhelmingly consider health insurance to be the most important workplace
benefit”).
170 See Jonathan Cohn, Hillary Clinton Calls For Eliminating Obamacare’s “Cadillac Tax:”
Economists won’t be happy, but unions will be, Huffington Post Politics (Sept. 30, 2015), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-obamacare-cadillac-tax_us_
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Many have lobbied long and hard for repeal of the tax. Indeed, Katy Spangler of the
American Benefits Council (ABC), has announced that ABC’s top three priorities are
repealing the Cadillac tax.171 ABC is a member of the Alliance to Fight the 40, a broad
based coalition of private and public employer organizations, unions, health care
companies, and others formed to promote the repeal of the Cadillac tax.172
In light of the widespread opposition to the Cadillac tax, it is perhaps not surprising
that legislators on both sides of the aisle oppose the Cadillac. Both Republican and
Democratic legislators have introduced bills to repeal the Cadillac tax.173 Democratic
Presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton174 and Bernie Sanders,175 endorse repeal of
the Cadillac tax. Moreover, Republican candidate Donald Trump supports repeal of the
Cadillac tax because he supports repealing the entire Affordable Care Act,176 and the
Cadillac tax is one of the elements of the Affordable Care Act.
A quick look at the history of the Cadillac tax illustrates its precarious nature.
Initially, the Cadillac tax was scheduled to take effect in 2013.177 A week later, its
effective date was extended to 2018.178 At the end of 2015, its effective date was
extended yet again, until 2020.179
This is not to suggest that repeal of the tax is absolutely certain.180 The Cadillac tax
560b0792e4b0dd850309b2c2 (discussing opposition to tax).
171 Blakely, supra note 76, at 4.
172 See Alliance to Fight the 40, http://www.fightthe40.com/about-the-alliance/.
173 See American Worker Health Care Tax Relief Act of 2015, S 2075, 114th Cong (2015) (sponsor
Sen. Sherrod Brown (D. Ohio)); Middle Class Health Benefits Tax Repeal Act of 2015, S 2045, 114th
Cong (2015) (sponsor Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV)); Middle Class Health Benefits Tax Repeal Act of 2015,
HR 2050, 114th Cong (2015) (sponsor Rep. Joe Courtney (D-CT)); Ax the Tax on Middle Class
Americans’ Health Plans Act, HR 879, 114th Cong (2015) (sponsor Rep. Frank Guinta (R-NH)).
174 See Laura Meckler and Stephanie Armour, Hillary Clinton Supports Repealing “Cadillac Tax” on
Health Plans: The Affordable Care Act’s tax on high-priced health insurance plans is opposed by labor
unions and republicans, The Wall Street Journal (Sept. 29, 2015).
175 Bernie Sanders sponsored a bill with Sen Sherrod Brown to eliminate the tax. American Worker
Health Care Tax Relief Act of 2015, S 2075, 114th Cong (2015).
176 See Dan Diamond, Donald Trump Hates Obamacare—So I Asked Him How He’d Replace It,
Forbes (July 31, 2015), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites#/sites/dandiamond/2015/07/31/donald-
trump-hates-obamacare-so-i-asked-him-how-hed-replace-it/#5c581efc5d5e.
177 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L 111-148 § 9001(c), 124 Stat 119, 853 (2010).
178 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L 111-152 § 1401(2)(B), 124 Stat
1029, 1059.
179 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub L 114-113, Div P § 101(a), 129 Stat 2242, 3037
(2015).
180 Castro, supra note 148 (contending that Congress is unlikely to repeal the tax because that would
create a sizeable hole in the budget and Congress has struggled to reach compromise on legislation,
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was intended to serve as a major source of revenue to cover the Affordable Care Act’s
ongoing costs. In addition, it was intended to reign in health care spending. Proponents
of the Affordable Care Act are likely to fight long and hard for the tax unless and until
an alternative source of funding and constraint on health care spending is found.181 As
Larry Levitt, senior vice president of Kaiser Family Foundation, has said, it is a bit
premature to write the epitaph for the Cadillac tax.182
particularly with respect to the Affordable Care Act).
181 See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, A message to my friends and allies about why repealing the Cadillac
tax is the wrong thing to do, Washington Post (Nov. 12, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/12/a-message-to-my-friends-and-allies-about-why-repealing-the-
cadillac-tax-is-the-wrong-thing-to-do/.
182 Larry Levitt, Why the Rukus over the Cadillac Plan Tax, JAMA Forum (Oct. 14, 2015), available
at http://newsatjama.jama.com/2015/10/14/why-the-ruckus-over-the-cadillac-plan-tax/.
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